Several How to’s describe operational practices with DNSSEC:
Below, frequently used commands are described:
To publish a DS to a parent zone, utilize pdnsutil show-zone and
take the DS from its output, and transfer it securely to your parent
zone.
pdnsutil disable-dnssec ZONE
Warning
Going insecure with a zone that has a DS record in the parent zone will make the zone BOGUS. Make sure the parent zone removes the DS record before going insecure.
As stated earlier, PowerDNS uses NSEC by default. If you want to use NSEC3 instead, issue:
pdnsutil set-nsec3 ZONE [PARAMETERS] ['narrow']
e.g.
pdnsutil set-nsec3 example.net '1 0 1 ab'
The quoted part is the content of the NSEC3PARAM records, as defined in 5155, in order:
1 (SHA1)1 for NSEC3 Opt-out, this best
set as 0- to use no saltOptionally, NSEC3 can be set to ‘narrow’ mode. For more information refer to (Hashed) Denial of Existence.
To convert a zone from NSEC3 to NSEC operations, run:
pdnsutil unset-nsec3 ZONE
Warning
Don’t change from NSEC to NSEC3 (or the other way around) for zones with algorithm 5 (RSASHA1), 6 (DSA-NSEC3-SHA1) or 7 (RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1).
As RRSIGs can expire, slave servers need to know when to re-transfer the zone. In most implementations (BIND, NSD), this is done by re-signing the full zone outside of the nameserver, increasing the SOA serial and serving the new zone on the master.
With PowerDNS in Live-signing mode, the SOA serial is not increased by default when the RRSIG dates are rolled.
For zones that use Native replication replication PowerDNS will serve valid RRSIGs on all servers.
For master zones (where replication happens by means of AXFR), PowerDNS slaves will automatically re-transfer the zone when it notices the RRSIGs have changed, even when the SOA serial is not increased. This ensures the zone never serves old signatures.
If your DNS setup uses non-PowerDNS slaves, the slaves need to know when the signatures have been updated. This can be accomplished by setting the SOA-EDIT metadata for DNSSEC signed zones. This value controls how the value of the SOA serial is modified by PowerDNS.
Note
The SOA serial in the datastore will be untouched, SOA-EDIT is applied to DNS answers with the SOA record.
The default-soa-edit or default-soa-edit-signed configuration options can instead be set to ensure SOA-EDIT is set for every zone.
The ‘inception’ refers to the time the RRSIGs got updated in live-signing mode. This happens every week (see Signatures). The inception time does not depend on local timezone, but some modes below will use localtime for representation.
Increments the serial with the number of weeks since the UNIX epoch. This should work in every setup; but the result won’t look like YYYYMMDDSS anymore.
For example: a serial of 12345678 will become 12348079 on Wednesday 13th of January 2016 (2401 weeks after the epoch).
Sets the new SOA serial number to the maximum of the old SOA serial number, and age in seconds of the last inception. This requires your backend zone to use the number of seconds since the UNIX epoch as SOA serial. The result is still the age in seconds of the last change to the zone, either by operator changes to the zone or the ‘addition’ of new RRSIGs.
As an example, a serial of 12345678 becomes 1452124800 on Wednesday 13th of January 2016.
Uses YYYYMMDDSS format for SOA serial numbers. If the SOA serial from the backend is within two days after inception, it gets incremented by two (the backend should keep SS below 98). Otherwise it uses the maximum of the backend SOA serial number and inception time in YYYYMMDD01 format. This requires your backend zone to use YYYYMMDDSS as SOA serial format. Uses localtime to find the day for inception time.
This changes a serial of 2015120810 to 2016010701 on Wednesday 13th of January 2016.
Sets the SOA serial to the number of seconds since the epoch.
Warning
Don’t combine this with AXFR - the slaves would keep refreshing all the time. If you need fast updates, sync the backend databases directly with incremental updates (or use the same database server on the slaves)
Ignore default-soa-edit and/or default-soa-edit-signed settings.
During typical PowerDNS operation, the private part of the signing keys are ‘online’, which can be compared to operating an HTTPS server, where the private key is available on the webserver for cryptographic purposes.
In some settings, having such (private) keying material available online is considered undesirable. In this case, consider running in pre-signed mode.
A slightly more complex approach is running a hidden master in simple online signing mode, but on a highly secured system unreachable for the public. Internet-connected slaves can then transfer the zones pre-signed from this master over a secure private network. This topology offers substantial security benefits with regards to key material while maintaining ease of daily operation by PowerDNS’s features in online mode.
See also Pre-signed records.
DNSSEC has a performance impact, mostly measured in terms of additional memory used for the signature caches. In addition, on startup or AXFR-serving, a lot of signing needs to happen.
Most best practices are documented in RFC 6781.
In zones signed by PowerDNS (so non-presigned zones), some TTL values need to be filled in by PowerDNS. The TTL of RRSIG record sets is the TTL of the covered RRset. For CDS, CDNSKEY, DNSKEY, NSEC, NSEC3 and NSEC3PARAM, we use the SOA minimum (the last number in the SOA record). Except for CDS/CDNSKEY/DNSKEY, these TTLs are chosen because RFC 4034 demands it so.
If you want a ‘normal’ TTL (3600, 86400, etc.) for your DNSKEY but a low TTL on negative answers, set your SOA minimum TTL to the high number, and set the TTL on the SOA record itself to the low TTL you want for negative answers. Note that the NSEC/NSEC3 records proving those negatives will get the high TTL in that case, and this may affect subsequent resolution in resolvers that do aggressive NSEC caching (RFC 8198).
Note
This behaviour was changed in version 4.3.0. We believe the language in RFC 4034 and 5155 about the NSEC(3) TTL is a mistake, and we have chosen to honour its spirit instead of its words.
NSEC(3) records now get the negative TTL (which is the lowest of the SOA TTL and the SOA minimum), which means their TTL matches that of an error such as NXDOMAIN. The warning about RFC8198 no longer applies.